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In their March 2015 Consultation paper on the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP), the European Commission and the High Representative raised the question whether the 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) “are the right objective for all or should 
more tailor-made alternatives be developed, to reflect differing interests and ambitions of some 
partners?” Such ambitious but complex trade agreements have now finally been signed with 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, but they are still on the table for several Mediterranean ENP 
countries. Although these Mediterranean partners have a completely different political, 
economic and legal relationship with the EU, some important lessons can be drawn from the 
‘Eastern DCFTA experience’. In particular, the DCFTA negotiators should avoid overly-
ambitious and ill-defined legislative approximation commitments and develop a comprehensive 
implementation strategy.   
In December 2011, the Council adopted negotiating directives for DCFTAs with 
Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, largely in response to the Arab spring that spread 
waves of democratic uprisings and protests throughout the Arab world. These four 
countries were selected because they are all WTO members, parties to the 2004 Agadir 
Agreement1 and were perceived – at that time – as having implemented sufficient 
economic and political reforms, including the bilateral ENP Action Plans. However, 
negotiations were only launched with Morocco in March 2013, and despite 
considerable progress on most chapters in the first four negotiation rounds, Morocco 
insisted on introducing a break in July 2014. Before continuing the trade talks, the 
Moroccan government wants to assess the results of its own new sectoral impact 
assessments, which were called for by the Moroccan civil society, fearing negative 
impacts on key sectors of their economy and the government’s ability to regulate 
economic and social sectors. With regard to the three other Mediterranean countries, 
                                                     
1 Named after the Moroccan city where the process to set up the pact was launched in May 2001, the 
free trade agreement was signed in Rabat in February 2004 and came into force in March 2007. 
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DCFTA negotiations are only expected to be launched in the near future with Tunisia 
(in the autumn this year). Technical preparations are ongoing in Jordan but a DCFTA 
scenario has become very unlikely for Egypt considering its fragile post-Arab Spring 
political climate.  
The Eastern DCFTAs: A right template for the Mediterranean countries? 
The Commission envisages that the ‘Mediterranean DCFTAs’ will have the same scope 
and objectives as the ‘Eastern DCFTAs’ signed by the EU last year with Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia as integral parts of overall Association Agreements. Both 
groups of trade agreements are developed in the same ENP framework that aims to 
conclude DCFTAs with all willing neighbouring countries that are able to implement 
and sustain such agreements. According to the European Commission, these DCFTAs 
have to go beyond traditional FTAs – which mainly reduce or eliminate tariffs and 
quotas for trade in goods – by covering substantially all trade in goods and services 
and including far-reaching provisions on competition, public procurement, 
intellectual property rights, etc. Moreover, in order to realise the neighbouring 
countries’ gradual “integration into the EU Internal Market”, legally binding 
provisions on legislative and regulatory approximation have to be incorporated. All 
these elements are indeed included in the Eastern DCFTAs and are now again 
envisaged by the Commission in the Mediterranean DCFTAs. Moreover, during the 
first DCFTA negotiations with Ukraine, the Council explicitly stated that certain 
aspects of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA “can serve as a model for other ENP partners in the 
future”2 and Commission officials confirmed that the negotiating directives for the 
Mediterranean DCFTAs are very similar to those adopted for the EaP countries. 
Nevertheless, there are obvious political and economic differences between the 
relationships of these two groups of countries with the EU. The Mediterranean 
partners are not eligible for EU membership and do not have EU accession ambitions. 
Consequently, they will be less eager to approximate huge chunks of EU acquis, as the 
three Eastern partners have done in their respective DCFTAs. Also the starting point 
for economic integration is completely different. Whereas the three Eastern countries 
immediately jumped from limited non-preferential Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements to ambitious DCFTAs, the Mediterranean countries already have in place 
a basic legal framework for trade liberalisation with the EU. The Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements (EMAAs) gradually established an FTA for trade in industrial 
goods, and additional sectoral protocols have been concluded on agricultural and 
fishery products, geographical indications and dispute settlement. Accordingly, 
contrary to the Eastern DCFTAs, the Moroccan DCFTA will most likely not include 
chapters on tariff reduction for industrial goods (which have been almost fully 
liberalised by the EMAA) and agricultural and fisheries products (which are covered 
by the recent agricultural protocol). Thus, considering these crucial differences, the 
Eastern DCFTAs are not appropriate templates to be used for the negotiations of the 
Mediterranean DCFTAs.  
 
                                                     
2 Council Conclusion on Strengthening the ENP, Brussels, 19 June 2007. 
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Lessons from the Eastern DCFTA experience 
Although ‘increased differentiation’ and ‘tailor-made approaches’ have become 
catchphrases in the various ENP communications, it is not excluded that the 
Commission will nevertheless copy elements of the Eastern DCFTAs in the 
Mediterranean trade deals. It is therefore crucial to identify the key inconsistencies and 
challenges related to the Eastern DCFTAs, to avoid their duplication in the 
Mediterranean agreements.  
1. Keep it real 
It is already clear from the Eastern DCFTAs that these countries have committed 
themselves – inspired by their EU accession ambitions – to approximate parts of the 
EU acquis in their own corpus of law that will be very difficult to implement. The EU 
and the Mediterranean countries should more strictly prioritise the scope of EU 
legislation to which the parties commit themselves, based on a proper ex-ante impact 
assessment. The Mediterranean countries should be careful not to overburden 
themselves with EU legislation that will not directly result in additional market access 
or is not relevant for their economic reforms. Nevertheless, the EU should still use the 
DCFTAs as instruments to promote its legislation in the area of sustainable 
development (e.g. environmental protection and social policies), but leave room for 
flexible adaptations. 
2. Keep it simple  
The hugely complex and comprehensive Eastern DCFTAs are no textbook cases of 
clear legal drafting. In particular, the various procedures related to legislative 
approximation lack a consistent approach. For example, in the Ukrainian DCFTA 
almost every DCFTA chapter has its own procedure for legal approximation. Whereas 
some chapters include far-reaching procedures to ensure a uniform interpretation and 
application of the annexed EU acquis (e.g. dynamic procedures to update the annexes 
and an obligation to follow the relevant case-law of the Court of Justice), others do not. 
Moreover, these Eastern DCFTAs include a mishmash of legal terms that refer to the 
process of the partners’ approximation to the annexed EU acquis (e.g. “implementation 
of”, “approximation to”, “alignment with” and “incorporation of”). Although it is still 
to be seen to what extent the Mediterranean partners will commit themselves to parts 
of the EU acquis, clear and consistent definitions of these obligations and more 
horizontal procedures should be provided.  
3. Develop a comprehensive implementation strategy  
Early experiences in the Eastern Partnership context illustrate that proper DCFTA 
implementation and enforcement are really only feasible if the fundamental ‘systemic’ 
democratic structures and principles are in place (e.g. rule of law, anti-corruption 
policies and independent judiciary). Therefore, in order to prepare the Mediterranean 
countries for DCFTA implementation, the EU should not only increase its technical 
support for economic modernisation under the European Neighbourhood Investment 
(ENI), e.g. via twinning projects and projects for SMEs, but also its assistance for 
systemic reforms, e.g. budget support with clear conditionalities. Finally, in order to 
properly assist the Mediterranean countries with their legislative approximation 
commitments, the European Commission and the respective EU Delegations should 
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develop, jointly with the partner countries, detailed implementation strategies. These 
should go beyond the mere listing of broad priorities or copying and pasting of 
DCFTA annexes, which has become routine practice in drafting the Association 
Agendas for the Eastern DCFTAs. 
Concluding remarks 
Considering the important differences between the EU’s eastern and southern 
neighbours, the EU should avoid path dependency when negotiating the 
Mediterranean DCFTAs. In particular, the Commission should learn from its Eastern 
DCFTA experience to avoid the negotiation of overly ambitious and complex 
Mediterranean DCFTAs. The fact that Commissioner Cecilia Malmström now avoids 
the DCFTA term for Tunisia, but refers to “negotiations on an ambitious partnership 
with the EU on trade and investment matters”, 3  could indicate a shift to a new tailor-
made Mediterranean trade policy. This approach should be confirmed in the review 
of the ENP. 
                                                     
3 Cecilia Malmström (2015), “Tunisia brings good news to Brussels””, blog post, 27 May 
(https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/malmstrom/blog/tunisia-brings-good-news-brussels-
1_en). 
